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This paper contributes to the current debate on university patents and knowledge transfer at 
two levels. First we present the results of the comparison of European and US academic 
patenting systems, and show that the common perception that Europe is lagging behind the 
US in terms of university patenting is far from being correct. Second, we develop an 
assessment of the efficiency of the academic IPR ownership model. Specifically, we assess 
whether  university-owned patents in Europe are more often applied, and/or more 
economically valuable, than patents that result from university research but are not owned by 
universities (university-invented). Our analysis starts from the observation that in our sample 
of six major European countries, about two-thirds of the patents that result (at least partly) 
from university research, are not owned by universities (but instead  are owned  in large 
measure by private firms). Given the different importance of Public Research Organisations 
(PRO) in the 6 EU countries considered, we have done the same analysis also for the case of 
PRO-owned and PRO-invented patents. A review of the theory of research joint ventures 
suggests that ownership is the result of a bargaining game, in which the relative bargaining 
positions depend, among other things, on characteristics of the inventive process. This is the 
starting point for applying two separate statistical treatment models. Our results indicate that, 
after correcting for observable patent characteristics, there are no significant differences 
between university-owned and university-invented patents.  
 
JEL Subject Classification: O3, I28  
Keywords: University patenting, public-private technology transfer, European universities 
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1. Introduction 
 
The role of u niversities  in the production of economically useful knowledge has received 
much recent attention in the policy debate. Policy initiatives leading to major institutional 
changes have been carried out in many countries following the idea that the university has to 
be more proactive in transferring knowledge to industry. It seems to us that in  most policy 
circles, a  vision of  the  American model based on the research university that owns the 
property rights on its inventions and actively seeks to exploit them, has been taken as the new 
way forward in Europe. Specifically, most of the policy attention has focused on the need for 
European countries to enact a ‘Bayh-Dole Act’-like legislation, which is expected to raise the 
number of patents owned by European universities.  
 
The focus on the role of patenting in knowledge transfer from universities to the private 
sector seems to largely ignore the empirical evidence that public-private knowledge transfer 
is a multi-faceted phenomenon that occurs through a number of channels of great variety 
(e.g., Cohen et al., 1998). These channels include scholarly publications such as journal 
articles, conferences and workshops where researchers from universities and the private 
sector meet, employment of graduates in private firms, research joint ventures, consultancy 
by university faculty, etc. In the setting of such a variegated set of relations and interactions, 
the model of a university taking out a patent on an invention resulting from one of its basic 
research projects, and then actively seeking a firm to license the patent to, seems to be only 
one of the many possible ways of transferring knowledge.  
 
In particular, in the next section, we present evidence that in Europe, even in the context of 
patented research results, such a characterization of the knowledge transfer process is far 
from the dominant way found in practice. Our evidence suggests that the largest part of 
(European) patents in which university researchers are involved as inventors, is owned by 
private firms, rather than universities. This suggests that the firm is involved in the university 
research as early as the pre-patent phase, and that who owns the patent (the firm, the 
university, or, in the context of some European countries, the researcher) is the result of a 
bargaining process. Our data confirm earlier impressions of the  empirical relevance, in 
Europe, of this type of involvement of university researchers in patenting by firms (e.g., 
Geuna and Nesta, 2006). 
 
This paper asks the question whether private ownership of patents on university research (or a 
combination of private and university research)  has any effect on the probability of 
commercialization of the patent, or on  the economic value of the patent. We focus on 
patenting as one channel of knowledge transfer without studying its relative 
efficiency/effectiveness compared to other channels. Specifically, we compare, in a European 
context,  university-owned patents (those patents that have a university assignee) with 
university-invented patents (those patents that have at least one university inventor, but are 
not owned by the university).  We employ data from a large scale survey among inventors of 
European patents (PatVal database
1) to assess whether university-owned patents in Europe 
are more often applied, and/or more economically valuable, than university-invented. 
 
The issue that emerges from the literature review that we provide below, and which forms the 
centre of our research question, is whether university ownership of patents on the research 
that is carried out by its researchers will enhance the efficiency of the knowledge transfer 
                                                                 
1 For more information on the PatVal Project, see Giuri, Mariani et al. (2005).   3 
process. The answer to this question obviously has large policy implications, because, as we 
show below in Section 3, many European universities tend to leave their patents to be owned 
by private parties (mostly firms). 
 
The literature review suggests that there may indeed be effects of patent ownership on the 
economic efficiency of patenting as a channel of university-to-private knowledge transfer. In 
particular, it is suggested (Agion and Tirole, 1994) that private ownership of patents in which 
university researchers cooperate may lower their incentive to provide a high-quality 
contribution, and (Hellman, 2005) that private ownership may be associated to less-efficient 
searching for commercial partners from the side of the university of the individual researcher. 
Our theoretical review also briefly covers the issue of what influences the decision of 
university researchers to yield the patent to the university or a private firm (Jensen, Thursby 
and Thursby, 2006).  
 
 
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we review the  relevant  theoretical 
contributions of IPR ownership in the context of public-private research joint ventures and 
present our hypotheses. The data sources and descriptive statistics  on university patent 
ownership are presented in the Section 3. Section 4 introduces further explanatory variables 
that we will use in the statistical analysis, and presents descriptive statistics of these. Section 
5 introduces the methodology and presents estimation results.  Finally, the  main result 
pointing to a lack of significant differences in the use and value of university-owned and 




2. University IPR Ownership and Technology Transfer 
 
Much of the current debates on the technological competitiveness of Europe centres, 
correctly or not, around what is known as the ‘European paradox’: Europe performs well in 
scientific research, but is bad in commercializing it (European Commission, 1995).
2 
Naturally, as an outcome of the central role of this ‘paradox’, policy emphasis has been put 
on the  working of industry  – science relations in Europe. The suggestion is that these 
relations leave much to be desired, and that policies are needed to make them more efficient.  
 
From an economic point of view, what could be the reasons for such underutilization of 
academic research in private businesses? Quite a few academic and policy works have 
suggested that European academic IPR institutions, or the lack of a strong enforcement of it, 
can be considered one of the major causes of the supposed low contribution of science to 
innovation. However, only very few theoretical works (and even less empirical validations) 
have addressed this issue using an analytical framework to assess if and when the lack of 
(strong) IPR, or the inappropriate assignment of it, can be considered as the cause of 
underutilisation of academic science.  
 
To the best of our knowledge, only the papers of Aghion and Tirole (1994), Hellman (2005) 
and Mazzoleni (2005) have developed full economic models to assess the impact of academic 
IPR on the efficiency of the development process. Mazzoleni (2005) analyses the social 
                                                                 
2 The concept of an existence of a European paradox has been challenged by scholarly work in recent years. See 
for example Tijssen and Van Wijk (1999), Brusoni and Geuna (2003) and Dosi, Llerena and Sylos-Labini 
(2005).   4 
welfare implications of academic patenting focusing on the a ppropriability conditions of 
downstream R&D.  It compares the two scenarios of ‘open access’ and ‘licensing’. The first 
is characterised by diffusion of knowledge through traditional open science channels while 
the second relies on academic patents. The paper is very much informed by the American 
context and does not take into account the issue of ownership of the property right, it is less 
relevant for the focus of our research, below we briefly discuss the predictions of the Hellman 
and Agion and Tirole models.  
 
The Hellman model is primarily aimed at the questions whether patents are an efficient form 
of knowledge transfer, and hence does not primarily focus on the issue of patent ownership. 
However, we feel that this model still has strong implications for our research question. It 
considers a two-stage research process, in which a university researcher  (the ‘scientist’) first 
develops an ‘idea’, and then seeks a firm to develop this idea into a commercial project. The 
main question that the model addresses is whether it makes any difference for the search 
process whether or not the idea is patented. Hellman shows that patents increase the incentive 
of the scientist to invest in search, but that the incentive of the firm to search for scientists is 
lowered by the patent (because the patent strengthens the bargaining power of the 
university/researcher).  
 
In an elaborate version of the model, there are three parties involved in the matching process: 
the scientist, the university (represented by a Technology Transfer Office, TTO), and the 
firm. In this model setup, the assumption is that the TTO has lower search costs, compared to 
the scientist, when looking  for interested firms.  For a given cost expenditure, the TTO 
realizes a higher probability for a match than the scientist on her own does.  Hence the 
involvement of the TTO increases the efficiency of the commercialization process, and also 
the expected rate of commercialization of university research projects. Hellman assumes that 
if the idea is patented, the patent is owned by the university, and the TTO is involved. This 
implies that once the idea is patented, the scientist looses control over it: negotiations on 
licensing etc. take place between the TTO and the firm. The scientist does have a choice, 
however, of whether or not disclosing the invention (to the TTO). The advantage of 
disclosure is that it raises the search efficiency, and hence the probability of commercial 
application. In return for this probability, the scientist can negotiate an up-front fee, or a share 
of the licensing income, from the TTO. 
 
The disadvantage of disclosure is that the scientist is no longer in a position to negotiate 
directly to the firm, because the TTO owns the patent. The firm, the TTO and the scientist are 
involved in a three-party bargaining game, and the relative share that the scientist gets from 
this game is lower than in the case of a direct bargaining process with the firm, in the version 
of the model where the TTO does not exist. Thus, the scientist faces a trade-off between 
disclosing, which raises the probability of commercialization, but lowers the pay-off of it, and 
non-disclosure, which lowers the probability of commercialization but raises the pay-off of it.  
 
Hellman shows that there are (plausible) parameter values where the negative effects of 
disclosure outweigh the positive effects, as seen from the scientist’s perspective. In this case, 
which is particularly likely when the search costs advantage of the TTO is not particularly 
strong (e.g., when the scientist is strongly embedded in a network with private firms), the 
scientist may choose not to disclose the idea to the TTO, but instead to search herself for an 
interested firm and ‘sell’ the idea directly to this firm. Note, however, that in Hellman’s 
model, “the major drawback is that without disclosure, the scientist never wants to file a 
patent, since the university would simply lay a claim on it” (Hellman, 2005, p. 26). It seems   5 
consistent to assume that in such cases, the firm would still patent the idea, and hence the 
firm patent would turn up with a university inventor. 
 
Although Hellman (2005) does not undertake a detailed welfare analysis of the case, it is 
clear that there may be a negative impact on social value of the university research if the 
scientist decides to not disclose the invention. This results, for example, because the 
involvement of the TTO, through its lower search costs, will increase the probability of 
commercialization.  Thus, we conclude that in the setting of the Hellman model, private 
ownership of patents based (partly) on university research, may be an indication of a less 
efficient matching process, and hence may lower the probability of commercial application of 
the patent.  
 
The paper by Aghion and Tirole (1994) analyzes the issue of the ownership of the patent in a 
different setting, which is the case of joint research projects between universities and private 
firms. They conclude that the assignment of property rights (patents) to the firm rather than 
the university may lead to market failure, i.e., the innovation resulting from the collaboration 
will have a lower value than could have been the case if the university had owned the patent. 
In this model, a university undertakes a research project for a private firm. Both parties need 
to invest in the project. Due to  uncertainty, the actual content of the innovation is non-
negotiable ex ante. Therefore, the contract specified for the research project is incomplete: it 
specifies only the attribution of the property right (who owns the patent, the university of the 
firm?), the license fee that the university obtains in case the patent is assigned to the firm, and 
the amount of investment of the firm. As an assumption, only one of the two parties involved 
may own the patent resulting from the project. 
 
In this setting, the pay-offs of the invention to the two parties are related to ownership. If the 
firm owns the invention, the university does not share in the profits from the invention. 
Instead, it is paid a pre-bargained fee that covers its research efforts. On the other hand, if the 
university owns the invention, both parties share the pay-off by means of a licensing fee 
levied by the university. The university and the firm bargain ex ante over ownership of the 
expected invention, taking into account these (expected) benefits. Then, the answer to the 
question of who will own the patent depends on two factors: the relative marginal impacts of 
the research efforts of both parties, and the ex ante bargaining power of both parties. We 
discuss both factors in turn. 
 
The relative marginal impacts of the two parties are important because the university only has 
an incentive to make the maximum effort in case it owns the patent. Due to the 
incompleteness of the research contract, the firm does not have the means to control whether 
or not the university makes the maximum effort. Thus, if the university does not own the 
invention, it’s best strategy is to ‘shirk’, i.e., provide a minimal research effort. Such a 
shirking university is obviously a problem for the firm, because it will lead to a less valuable 
invention. If the relative marginal impact of the university's research effort is large, this 
becomes a serious problem, and the firm is therefore likely to leave ownership to the 
university.  
 
In the formal model, Aghion and Tirole compare the pay-offs to the firm under both modes of 
ownership. If the firm owns the patent, it gets the full amount of pay-offs (net of the lump 
sum payment to the university). If the university owns the invention, the firm gets only part 
of the total payoff. Thus, the firm compares a shared pay-off under maximum effort by the 
university to the full pay-off with a 'shirking' university. Obviously, the higher the marginal   6 
impact of the university effort, the more likely it is that the first of these situations will lead to 
a higher pay-off for the firm. Thus, the higher the marginal impact of the university effort, the 
higher the willingness of the firm to leave ownership of the invention to the university.  
 
Bargaining power for the university also influences the assignment of the patent. For 
example, if the university has specific knowledge that makes it a research monopolist, the 
firm may have to choose between no project at all (and hence no pay-offs) and sharing pay-
offs with the university. As long as the shared pay-offs are positive, the firm will then still 
undertake the research project and leave the patent to the university (which would be socially 
optimal). 
 
A case of market failure may emerge when the university does not have strong bargaining 
power and the relative marginal impacts of the two parties are such that the firm is unwilling 
to leave the patent to the university. To see how this emerges, let us call the value of the 
innovation under firm ownership of the patent (i.e., minimum effort by the university) V
0. 
Now assume that the extra effort that the university would be willing to make in exchange for 
ownership leads to an increase in the invention value equal to D > 0. Obviously, as long as D 
> 0, the social value of the innovation goes up with a transfer of the patent to the university. 
But, because in this case the firm only gets a share of the invention value, its private pay-off 
may be lower. Assume the firm gets a share s (Aghion and Tirole assume s = ½). Then, s(V
0 
+ D) <  V
0, or D < V
0(1 - s)/s would be sufficient to prevent the firm from making the 
socially efficient decision to leave the patent to the university.  
 
The extra effort of the university need not always lead to a larger value of the invention (D > 
0) because the effort of the firm is endogenous. The optimal firm effort may go down as a 
result of increased university effort. In such a case, market failure does not take place, and the 
allocation of the patent to the firm is optimal.  
 
Note that market failure only results if the university is cash constrained, which is an 
assumption of the model, and the firm has a large degree of bargaining power. If the 
university is not cash-constrained, it would be able to pay the firm the difference V
0 – s(V
0 + 
D) and still have positive pay-offs itself. Because the firm is not assumed to be cash 
constrained, market failure is not a possibility in case in which the university owns the patent 
(i.e., when it has high ex ante bargaining power).  
 
Whether the strong assumption on pay-off maximizing and cash constrained universities is 
realistic, can be debated. As long as the firm behaves in a strictly profit-maximizing way, 
market failure due to a lack of university ownership of patents is a possibility. Arguably, in 
the framework of the Aghion and Tirole model, universities not being interested in monetary 
pay-offs only reinforce the possibility of market failure.  
 
In the context of our empirical analysis below, the question what determines whether a patent 
on university research is owned by the university, plays an essential role. Obviously, both the 
Hellman (2005) and Aghion and Tirole (1994) models address this issue. In Hellman (2005), 
it is the relative efficiency of the university researcher in searching for interested commercial 
parties, as well as the value of involving the university researcher in the development process 
(this increases the bargaining power of the scientist) that are the main input into the decision 
on disclosure of the patent. In Aghion and Tirole (1994), it is primarily the relative (marginal) 
contribution of the university researcher to the research outcome that influences ownership. 
   7 
Finally, the recent paper by Jensen, Thursby and Thursby (2006) addresses the issue of patent 
ownership in a more direct way. Their model is a 2-stage game, in which a research project is 
first applied for funding with public funding agencies, and in a final stage may be 
commercialized by consulting of the university scientist to a firm. Their model focuses on the 
impact of differences in the quality of the university researcher, and differences in the 
difficulty of the research project. With higher quality researchers, the model predicts that 
university ownership of the resulting patents is more likely (ceteris paribus). Project difficulty 
mainly works indirectly through research agency funding, and the effect of more funding is 
argued to increase the likelihood of university ownership. 
 
What can be done about the market failure due to a ‘wrong’ assignment of patents resulting 
from university  – private research collaboration? The fact that the market failure is 
asymmetric (only firms owning patents can be inefficient) makes it possible to eliminate the 
sources of it  by giving universities more bargaining p ower, for example by a piece of 
legislation like the Bayh-Dole Act that was introduced in the U.S. in 1980 (Eisenberg, 1996, 
provides an overview of the debates surrounding the introduction of the Bayh-Dole Act). This 
law provides universities in the USA with the right to own patents on research that was 
sponsored from federal sources such as the National Science Foundation (NSF).  
 
The usual economic logic behind the Bayh-Dole Act (for an overview, see, e.g., Mowery et 
al., 2001) is that these patents will facilitate technology transfer from universities to private 
firms (see also our above discussion of Hellman, 2005). When university research generates 
knowledge that may be applied in commercial products or processes, private firms may be 
interested in this knowledge. But when it comes to making additional investments in order to 
transform the university-generated knowledge into a commercial application, an additional 
incentive problem may pose itself. A firm that endeavours to undertake the additional R&D 
that is necessary to develop the commercial application will only consider this a useful 
undertaking when it has a prospect of deterring imitation by competitors. This is only 
possible if the firm that develops the applied knowledge to turn the university discovery into 
a commercial application has an exclusive right to do so. Otherwise competitors may move 
in, and use the freely available university knowledge to develop a competing application, and 
this prospect is enough to discourage private investment following up university research. 
The only way in which the firm that wants to develop the university discovery may obtain 
exclusivity, is when the university patents its discovery, and grants an exclusive license to the 
firm. 
 
Note that this argument is somewhat more extensive than the setting of the Aghion and Tirole 
model discussed above. It sketches a two-stage research process, with the university 
undertaking the basic research, and the firm the applied (or experimental) research, whereas 
the Aghion and Tirole model considers a research joint venture. The ‘common logic’ also 
does not pose the question of ownership of the patent (either the firm interested in the 
research, or the university itself). Since we are primarily interested in the issue of ownership 
(for the empirical reasons discussed below), we prefer to use the Aghion and Tirole line of 
argument, but we notice that this leads to the same conclusion, i.e., that universities should be 
stimulated legally to patent their inventions, as the common  argument in the Bayh-Dole 
debate.  
 
Note also that there is a subtle difference between the US context of the Bayh-Dole Act and 
the situation in European nations. In the US, because of its federal structure, a specific 
question with regard to ownership of federally sponsored research had emerged (Mowery and   8 
Sampat, 2001). Funding bodies such as the NIH and NSF could claim rights because they co-
financed research, and universities could equally do so because they financed part of the 
research themselves, and because they employed the researchers and owned the labs in which 
the research was done. U.S. law did not provide an immediate and clear answer as to who 
held the rights to patent federally funded research. Hence the funding bodies and the 
universities usually engaged in complicated negotiations over these rights. First, these 
negotiations were taking place on a case-by-case basis, but later on so-called Institutional 
Patent Agreements (IPAs) were introduced by the larger funding agencies. The Bayh-Dole 
act was introduced in order to streamline the multiple arrangements in this field.  
 
A phenomenon like the IPAs found in the US is (still) largely unknown in Europe because the 
share of research directly funded by large independent funding organizations is still relatively 
small (possibly with the exception of the UK). Instead, a different issue seems to emerge with 
regard to the patenting of European university research. In some European countries Bayh-
Dole act like regulation giving the ownership of IPR to the university instead of the professor 
(professorial rights) has been in force for many years (though possibly not enforced), while in 
other countries it has been introduced only recently in an emulation of the Bayh-Dole act. 
Across European countries (except Italy) there is now strong support for the assignation of 
IPR ownership to the university based on the view that this policy can help to solve the 
“European paradox”. The evidence usually put forward is that European universities have 
many fewer patents than US universities and there is therefore a need of new regulation to 
create incentives for them to be more active. In this paper we endeavour to examine the 
validity of this rational using the Aghion and Tirole framework to study new original data on 
university patenting in Europe gathered in the Patval survey.     
 
 
3. A First Assessment of European Academic Patenting 
 
For our empirical analysis we rely on the Patval survey. For a full description of the survey 
sample, methodology, and a preliminary analysis of the response see Giuri, Mariani et al. 
2005. The survey was addressed at inventors listed on (granted) European patents with a 
priority date in the period 1993 – 1997, in six European countries: Germany, France, Italy, 
The Netherlands, Spain and the UK. These six countries accounted for about 88% of granted 
EPO patents whose first inventor has an address in of the EU-15 countries (about 42% of the 
total EPO). The survey was carried out in the period July 2003 - April 2004. We obtained 
responses  relating to 9,017 patents representing 18% of all granted EPO patents with a 
priority date in the considered period.  
 
On the basis of a question that asked where the inventor was employed at the time of the 
invention, we were able identify 433 patents in which at least one of the inventors was 
employed by a university  (we will label these  'university patents' from now on). They 
represent 4.8% of our sample. Gambardella, Harhoff and Verspagen (2005) have constructed 
sampling weights for the 9,017 observations, defined as the inverse probability of a patent 
being in the set of 9,017 observations. These weights are based on a comparison of the 
responses with all granted patents with a similar priority date in the six countries, on the basis 
of observable characteristics in the patent document (such as inventor country, priority date, 
technology class), as well as citations received. These weights enable us to assess the 
representativeness of the 433 university patents relative to the total sample, i.e., to determine 
whether or not the inventors of university patents are more or less likely to respond.  
   9 
The results of this calculation show that we have a very small overrepresentation of 
university patents: the share of our 433 cases in the sum of the sampling weights over the 
complete (n = 9,017) sample is 4.93%, while in terms of the number of observations, their 
share is 4.80% (433/9,017).
3 In the remainder of this paper, we ignore this, and proceed as if 
our university patents sample is representative of the larger universe in the six countries. 
 
Table 1 presents, for each country in the sample, the total number of patents and it breaks 
down ownership of the patent into university or non-university. University-owned patents are 
those patents that have a university assignee, while  university-invented patents are those 
patents that have at least one university inventor but they are not owned by a university. What 
the table brings out very clearly is that the large majority of patents in which university 
inventors were involved is n ot owned by universities.
4  In all countries except Spain, the 
fraction of university-owned patents in university patents is far below half. 
 
Table 1. Ownership of European University/PRO Patents 
  Germany  Italy  France  UK  Spain  Nether-
lands 
Total 
Number of University patents  108  50  60  139  17  59  433 




























Number of PRO patents  62  13  77  37  7  40  236 



























Although this paper focuses mainly on academic patents, the intricacies of  the  university 
system in certain EU countries such as France and Italy, for example, in which Public 
Research Organisations (PROs) overlap at least in part with universities, requires us also to 
consider PRO-patents (those patents that have at least one PRO inventor). The second part of 
Table 1 provides this information. As expected, countries with important PRO infrastructure 
such as France and the Netherlands have a significant number of number of PRO patents, less 
so the UK where most of the research is carried out in universities. France is the only country 
where the number of PRO patents in the sample is larger than the number of university 
patents.  
 
Interestingly, compared to the situation in universities, the case of PRO patents is less clear-
cut in terms of ownership. Although in the data for all countries the number of invented PRO 
patents is still the majority, this is the result of opposite situations in the various countries 
(probably dependent on different institutional and legal configuration). In the cases of 
                                                                 
3 These results differ between countries. The shares of university patents in the samples per country are as 
follows (the results are presented as share in number of cases/share in weights): UK 9.01%/9.22%, DE 
3.23%/3.62%, FR 4.04%/3.95, IT 4.00%/3.94%, NL 5.25%/5.18%, ES 6.32%/6.07%. The deviation between the 
two percentages is most serious in Germany (DE), where we seem to have some overrepresentation of university 
inventions.  
4 See Geuna and Nesta, 2006 and references cited in their paper for preliminary evidence of this phenomenon in 
a few European countries.   10 
Germany, the Netherlands and Spain  PRO-owned patents are more frequent than  PRO-
invented patents, the contrary applies to the cases of France, Italy and the UK.
5   
 
Table 2 analyses in more detail the ownership structure of invented patents. About 4/5th of 
the university-invented patents are owned by companies, 10% are assigned to governmental 
offices of various kinds, PROs and other Public Private Partnerships (PPPs)  and 9% to 
individuals (mostly in the case of Germany and Italy).
6 Companies play a (slightly)  less 
dominant role i n the case of  PRO-invented patents, accounting for about 60% of them. 
Apparently, PROs being more often  more directly linked to government results in a higher 
share of ownership by governmental offices (about 30%). A particular case is military 
research, 17% of the PRO-invented patents where assigned to the UK Secretary of State for 
Defence  (UK), underlying the important role of military research in the UK. Finally, 
individuals account for 9% as in the case of university patents. 
 
Table 2. Ownership of European University/PRO Invented  Patents 
  Ownership  Total Sample 
Companies  287 (81%) 
Government, PRO, PPP  36 (10%) 
 
University-invented patents 
Individuals  31 (9%) 
Companies  81 (60%) 
Government, Univ., PPP  43(31%) 
 
PRO-invented patents 
Individuals  12 (9%) 
 
 
The first contribution this paper wants to make is to compare the US university technology 
transfer system with our own data on Europe to assess if there is indeed a major difference 
between the patent output of US universities and European universities (here represented by 
our sample), as often claimed by most policy literature. Some commentators have argued that 
Europe is 20 years behind the US, referring to the Bayh-Dole Act as the departure point of a 
new technology transfer model that Europe  needs to follow to support a more significant 
contribution of European universities to the innovative process of firms. In other words, 
European universities do not produce a sufficient number of patents (based on national and 
OECD statistics of university-owned patents) and therefore they are not efficient in 
technology transfer.  
 
If we look at US data for the period 1993-1997 we discover that academic patents accounted 
for between 1.9% and 4.3% of USPTO patents depending if we considered all USPTO 
patents or only the one assigned to US organisations (private and non-profit) (NSF, 2004). 
Given the absence of a response bias for university patents, it is clear that European 
universities have a (broadly) similar share as  compared to US universities.  Why  do  our 
results differ in such a dramatic way compared to the commonly accepted policy view of a 
technologically low-performing higher education system in Europe? The most important 
                                                                 
5 The case of the UK can be explained by the fact that the only two major PROs were active in the period 
considered. These were DERA (now privatised as QuinetiQ) and the Medical Research Centre, both owned by 
the respective ministry and therefore the ownership of patents was assigned to the ministries.  
6 In the period considered in our analysis, the British Technology Group (BTG) was created from the 
privatisation of the National Research Development Corporation (merged with the National Enterprise Board), 
the public organisation created in the late 1940s to commercialise innovations resulting from publicly funded 
research. Following the tradition, until the mid 1990s, BTG was chosen by a large number of universities to be 
the assignee of academic patents. Our sample includes 14 patents assigned to BTG, they were classified in the 
companies class.   11 
reason is that official data take only into account university-owned patents, and therefore 
underestimate in a macroscopic way the activity of European universities. Thursby, Thursby 
and Fuller (2006) show that this phenomenon (firms owning patents to university research) 
also occurs in the (post Bayh-Dole) US, although at a relatively lower frequency than in the 
European sample we use. 
 
Table 3. Ownership of US University Patents 
  Share of total academic patents 
Total number of University patents  5772 
# University-owned patents  66% 
# University-invented patents  32% 
US federal government as one of the assignees  2% 
Author elaboration of data from Thursby et al. (2006). 
 
Can we find a way to adjust the US data to take into account of the ownership issue? The US 
NSF data take into account only university-owned patents, however, Thursby, Thursby and 
Fuller (2006)
7 have put together information at the inventor level controlling for ownership 
for 87 research intensive universities accounting for about 5,800 patents in the middle 1990s. 
Table 3 presents an elaboration of their data. 
 
Although we acknowledge that the two samples may be not perfectly comparable, the first 
striking observation that can be is that while in the US about 2/3rd of university patents are 
owned by the university that employed one of the inventors, in Europe university ownerships 
accounts for less than 1/5th. These data seems to point to the existence of two different 
models of university technology transfer. The American model is mainly based on the 
university owning the rights to the discovery made by one of its academic employees; on the 
basis of this right, the university commercialises the discovery via the technology transfer 
office (TTO). Instead, the European model of academic technology transfer is mainly based 
on a direct transfer of property rights from the academic inventor (or university) to the private 
sector (usually a  large firm), with only a minor role for university ownership and TTOs 
activity in licensing or spin-offs. 
 
One may argue that the figures presented here clearly show the incentive creation effect that 
the Bayh-Dole  Act had i n the US system. But does this lead to a much higher academic 
patents production in the US system as compared to Europe? If we adjust the data for the US 
taking into account that the official statistics underestimate of  about 1/3rd the number of 
university patents (generalising the result of Table 3  that about 1/3rd of patents had an 
academic inventor but were not owned by the university), and we recalculate the two shares 
of academic patents on US-PTO patents present above, we would end up with a bracket 2.5% 
- 5.7% (depending on whether US university patents are expressed as a share of total 
USPTO-issued patents, or only those assigned to US residents). Anecdotal evidence suggests 
that the share of foreign-residents in h olding domestic patents is higher in the US than in 
Europe, and hence the upper end of the bracket (5.7%) is probably a better benchmark than 
the lower bracket. Comparing the upper bracket value with the 4.8% from our sample, we 
conclude that US academic patent output as a fraction of total patents is at most about 15% 
higher in the US than in Europe.  
 
                                                                 
7 We want to thank Jerry Thursby for having allowed us to access their data on the US system before 
publication.   12 
To understand the relative importance of this difference it is worth remembering (Table 2 
above) that a significant part of the European science system is institutionally organised in 
the various national public research organisations (such as the Max Plank Institute, CNRS, 
CNR, etc..) while public research organisations in the US tend to be more specialised and 
have a relatively lower size.  Thus, a  sizable p ortion  of European scientific activity  that 
generates patents is situated outside the university system in the public research organisations 
(Cesaroni and Piccaluga, 2005), therefore some of the difference between US and European 
academic patent output should be attributed to the different institutional set up. 
  
These back-of-the-envelop calculations aim to make the point that once the available data is 
adjusted  for the ownership structure, thus taking into account the different university 
technology transfer models, and for the different institutional set up of science, it is not so 
clear that the US system is outperforming the European system. US universities may have 
had more patents than European universities in absolute terms, however they did not have a 
much higher share of national patents.  
 
These results shed some doubts on the impact that the Bayh-Dole Act has had on the US 
academic system and on the value of its applicability to the European context. Our data seems 
to be consistent with the evidence put forward by a series of papers of Mowery, Nelson, 
Sampat and Ziedonis
8 that argued that the increased number of university patents is mainly 
due to the emergence of the new technological opportunities offered by biomedical and ICT 
research as well as the changes in IPR regulation carried out in the US during the eighties and 
nineties to increase appropriability and patentability. Preliminary evidence put forward for 
Germany and Italy (Geuna and Nesta, 2006) seems to indicate that also European universities 
have responded to increased technological opportunities as shown by the increased number of 
university patents in the 1980s’ and 1990s’.  
  
3.1 Technology transfer and market failure 
Apparently, although European universities are involved in research with commercial value 
(i.e., leading to patentable inventions), they do not particularly care to exploit the results of 
this research by means of owning the associated patent. As the review of the Aghion and 
Tirole model above suggests, either a lack of university bargaining power or a relatively low 
marginal contribution of university efforts to the outcome of the research projects may be 
responsible for this. We may take the distribution of inventors over the two parties as an 
indication of the relative marginal impact of research efforts. Table 4 provides information on 
this variable for the sample of 384 patents for which we have this information. In this sample, 
slightly less than half (45%) of all patents has only university inventors. 55 % of all patents 
has university inventors and non-university inventors.  
 
Table 4. Ownership and inventorship of university patents 
  Only university 
inventor(s) 
University inventor(s) and 
other type inventor(s) 
Total 
University-owned patents  53 (31% of column)  11 (5% of column)  64 
University-invented patents  119 (69% of column)  201 (95% of column)  320 
Total  172 (45% of row)  212 (55% of row)  384 
 
Within the group of patents that has non-university inventors, only 5% are university-owned. 
Within the group of patents with only university inventors, this percentage is larger (31%), 
although still clearly less than half. Thus, if we take the distribution of inventors over the 
                                                                 
8 See Mowery et al (2004) for a summary for their results.   13 
research partners as a (broad) indication of relative marginal research impact, the data seem 
to support the idea (in Aghion and Tirole) that this variable has an impact on the distribution 
of ownership of the invention. 
 
This preliminary result suggests that ‘the market’ indeed deals with the question of ownership 
of intellectual property rights in case of public-private research joint ventures. However, as 
the Aghion and Tirole model shows, such market exchanges of patent ownership may still be 
prone to market failures. Since we also have data on the (perceived) value of inventions,
9 we 
are in a position to test for the existence of such market failure. 
 
In doing so, we make use of the outcome of the Aghion and Tirole model that market failure 
occurs in an asymmetric way: if the market fails to provide the optimal innovation size, it is 
because the firm takes ownership where this should have been assigned to the university. 
Thus, if market failure plays a significant role, we would expect that, ceteris paribus, the 
value of patents would be lower for the sample where firms own the patent than for the 
sample where universities own the patent (in this case, the model predicts that the market 
produces the optimal innovation value). Thus, we formulate our research question as follows: 
can we find, ceteris paribus, the factors that impact on ownership of patents resulting from 
public – private research joint ventures, a positive effect of university ownership on the 
economic value, and/or the rate of commercial application of patented inventions? If the 
answer to this research question is positive, this amounts to support for a “European Bayh-
Dole Act”.  
 
 
4. Explanatory variables and descriptive statistics 
There are 433 university related inventions in the PatVal dataset, 79 (18%) of them owned by 
the university and 354 (82%) owned by a firm or another non-university entity. We start by 
studying the characteristics of the university-owned and non-university-owned sub samples 
along a list of variables capturing both invention and inventor’s backgrounds.  Table 5 
presents the variable definitions.  
We have constructed six variables to try to capture the economic value and the rate of 
commercial application of patented inventions.
10 T hree  of these  capture the 
commercialization of the patent: commercial use by the applicant itself,  licensing
11 and 
creation of a start up.  These three variables are dummy variables with value 1 if the 
respondent indicated patent use. We also construct a summary variable Patent Used with 
value 1 if at least one of the three forms of use had value 1. The PatVal Questionnaire also 
asked the respondent to provide a  (subjective) evaluation of the value of the patent. The 
responses were structured in 10 asymmetric intervals ranging from less than €30,000 to more 
than €300 million.
12 Finally we used the number of forward citations as a proxy for the use of 
the patent in subsequent inventive processes. Finally, we include the number of citations 
                                                                 
9 For discussion on the robustness and use of the information on the (perceived) value of invention see 
Gambardella et al. (2005). 
10 See Appendix 1 for a selection of questions used in the PatVal questionnaire regarding this category of 
variables. 
11 We assume that if a patent is licensed, the licensee commercializes the patent. 
12 Although this is a subjective variable that could be severely contaminated by measurement errors, it has been 
extensively validated by the PatVal team and the results of this validation process seemed highly consistent (see 
Gambardella, et. al, 2005, Giuri, Mariani, et al., 2005).    14 
received by a patent (forward citations), which has been proposed by, among others, 
Trajtenberg (1990) as an indirect indicator of economic value of the patent. 
 
Table 5. Variable definitions 





Dummy, 1 if the patent was used commercially 




Dummy, 1 if the applicant/owner has used the 
patent commercially 
  Licensed 
Dummy, 1 if applicant/owner has licensed out 
the patent 
  Start up 
Dummy 1 if the patent was used to start a new 
Firm 
  N





Value of invention as estimated ex post by inventor, based on interval 
responses. We took the natural log of the mean value of each interval 
plus the right border of the lowest interval and the left border of the 
top interval. 
Inventor  Age  Age of the inventor at time of survey 





Number of years between year of graduation and 





Number of years in the job when the patent 
was invented 
  Male  Dummy variable for sex  




Total number of patent applications at EPO by 
The inventor (ln) 
Invention 
Background 
R&D total costs 
 
Inventor estimate of total R&D costs leading to  





Number of man-months for research leading to 





Dummy, whether patent is part of a family (a 
family is a set of technically interrelated patents) 
  N
o words claim  Number of words in the claims (ln) 
  N
o IPC 4 digit  Number of 4 digit IPC classes (ln) 
  N
o inventors  Number of inventors listed 
   Multiple applicants  Dummy, whether there is more than 1 applicant 
  Cooperation  Dummy, whether non-university inventor(s) were present 
   FormCol  Dummy, whether there was a formal collaboration agreement 
Technology ISI-EIEng  Dummy, 1 for electrical engineering 
Effects  ISI_Instr  Dummy, 1 for instruments 
  ISI_ChePha  Dummy, 1 for chemicals / pharmaceuticals 
  ISI_PrEng  Dummy, 1 for precision engineering 
   ISI_MechEng  Dummy, 1 for mechanical engineering 
Country  UK  Country dummy United Kingdom 
Effects  DE  Country dummy Germany 
  IT  Country dummy Italy 
  ES  Country dummy Spain 
  NL  Country dummy Netherlands 
   FR  Country dummy France 
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To control for heterogeneity between patents, we built 16 control variables capturing inventor 
background –a set of variables with background information of the inventor answering the 
questionnaire
13–  and invention background  –a set of variables w ith information about 
characteristics of the invention  process  leading to the patent. Finally,  to control for 
institutional characteristics such as differences in the legal system and technological 
opportunities, we created country –according to where the research leading to the invention 
was located– and technology dummy variables –according to the patent’s main IPC at 4 
digits. Table 6 presents a comparison of these variables according to the ownership of the 
patent (university-owned versus university-invented). 
  
Table 6. Patent characteristics in each sub-sample 








Impact   Patent used (0/1)  0.709 0.548  0.061 -2.632  0.009 433  *** 
  Commercial used (0/1)  0.494 0.468  0.062 -0.421  0.674 433   
  Licensed (0/1)  0.557 0.150  0.048 -8.456  0.000 433  *** 
  Start up (0/1)  0.228 0.082  0.038 -3.825  0.000 433  *** 
  N
o of Forward citations  0.114 0.500  0.138 2.792  0.006 433  *** 
   Value (ln)  6.226 5.962  0.218 -1.212  0.226 433   
Inventor  Age  45.6 46.5  1.361 0.691  0.490 433   
Background Graduation  1978.9 1977.7  1.366 -0.936  0.350 433   
  Experience  5.722 5.394  0.828 -0.395  0.693 433   
  Tenure  12.418 15.093  1.275 2.099  0.036 433  ** 
  Male  0.937 0.952  0.027 0.558  0.577 433   
  Postdoc degree  0.899 0.808  0.047 -1.923  0.055 433  * 
   EPO patent applications  0.290 0.646  0.076 4.709  0.000 433  *** 
Invention  R&D total costs  11.181 10.961  0.216 -1.017  0.310 433   
Background Man Months  5.411 4.569  0.219 -3.847  0.000 433  *** 
  Family  0.468 0.503  0.062 0.560  0.576 433   
  N
o words claim (ln)  4.682 4.758  0.087 0.873  0.383 433   
  N
o IPC 4 digit (ln)  0.419 0.343  0.056 -1.353  0.177 433   
  N
o inventors  0.869 1.094  0.066 3.436  0.001 433  *** 
   Multiple applicants (0/1)  0.152 0.085  0.037 -1.826  0.069 433  * 
  Cooperation (0/1)  0.152 0.565  0.059 6.991  0.000 433  *** 
  FormCol (0/1)  0.380 0.723  0.057 6.057  0.000 433  *** 
Technology ISI-EIEng (0/1)  0.165 0.138  0.044 -0.599  0.550 433   
Effects  ISI_Instr (0/1)  0.291 0.192  0.051 -1.958  0.051 433  * 
  ISI_ChePha (0/1)  0.304 0.367  0.596 1.064  0.288 433   
  ISI_PrEng (0/1)  0.177 0.195  0.049 0.361  0.718 433   
   ISI_MechEng (0/1)  0.063 0.107  0.037 1.183  0.238 433    
Country  UK (0/1)  0.570 0.266  0.056 -5.396  0.000 433  *** 
Effects  DE (0/1)  0.051 0.294  0.053 4.612  0.000 433  *** 
  IT (0/1)  0.025 0.136  0.040 2.792  0.006 433  *** 
  ES (0/1)  0.114 0.023  0.024 -3.834  0.000 433  *** 
  NL (0/1)  0.152 0.133  0.043 -0.447  0.655 433   
   FR (0/1)  0.089 0.150  0.043 1.422  0.156 433   
(***) denotes 1% significance level, (**) denotes 5% significance level and (*) denotes 10% significance level. 
                                                                 
13 Note that the inventor who answered the questionnaire is not necessarily always (one of) the university 
inventors of the patent.    16 
 
The country effects show that there are major differences between both sub samples in the 
distribution of patents across the different countries, in line with the results presented above 
in Table 1. The UK and Spain account for a significantly higher fraction of patents in the 
university-owned group than in the university-invented group, while in Italy and Germany, 
the situation is reverse. For France and the Netherlands, we do not reject the null hypothesis 
of a balanced proportion of both types of patents. 
 
In comparison to the major differences in the distribution of the rates of university-owned 
patents across countries, the results regarding the technology effects  are  more balanced. 
Indeed, the only technology class where we are able to reject the null hypothesis of equal 
shares in both groups is Instruments, with 29% of university owned patents but only 19% of 
patents in the other group. But this difference is only significant at the 10% level. 
 
Regarding the differences in the distribution of inventor’s characteristics across both sub 
samples of patents, we also observe a fairly balanced pattern. The only exceptions are the 
variables Tenure and the number of EPO patent applications by the inventor, where the mean 
is higher in the non-university owned group, and whether or not the inventor holds a postdoc 
(PhD) degree. Non-university owned patents have a (much) higher fraction of inventors with 
a postdoc degree. 
 
There are more statistically significant differences regarding to some of the characteristics of 
the invention process. Here we find that the mean number of man months invested in the 
invention process is higher in the case of university owned patents (although we do not find a 
significant variable for the financial investment, i.e., R&D costs). The proportion of patents 
with multiple applicants is also higher in the university owned patents. On the other hand, the 
number of inventors  per patent i s higher in the non-university owned group of patents. 
Finally, we find that the proportion of patents in which there was cooperation (meaning that 
both university- and non-university-inventors were present) is higher for the non-university-
owned group, and the same holds for patents wre the respondent reported a formal 
collaboration. 
 
Finally,  and most directly related to our research question, for the variables on 
commercialization and value, we do not find any difference between the two groups with 
regard to the inventor’s perceived value of the patent. On the other hand, we do find that the 
number of forward citations  is higher in the non-university owned group. H owever, the 
probability of that the patent was actually used is higher in the group of university owned 
patents. Investigating further the reasons for this higher rate of used by university owned we 
find that this  is related to two effects: licensing (56% of university owned patents were 
licensed with only 15% in the other group) and launching start up firms (23% of university 
owned patents were also used as a basis for starting-up a new firm versus 8% only in the 
other group). Perhaps surprisingly, we find no significant difference between the two groups 
with regard to commercial application by the applicant itself. Since universities are normally 
not in the habit of undertaking economic activity other than education and research, we 
would expect that this variable would be rather low for the university category. However, we 
find that roughly half of the university owned patents are reported to have been used for 
commercial purposes by the applicant/owner. Our suspicion, based on inspection of the data, 
is that (university) respondents have taken licensing as one form of commercial application, 
and hence this variable overlaps partly with the licensing variable. This implies that we 
should not put too much emphasis on the results for this particular variable, and instead focus   17 
mainly on the other use variables, including (especially) the one that summarizes the various 
categories (Patent Used). 
 
 
5. Statistical Results 
 
Taking these differences (or the absence of them) in the rate of commercialization and the 
value variables at face value, we cannot determine whether they are related to the ownership 
effect, or to some other underlying differences between the  patents in each of the two 
samples. In other words, are the findings for commercialization and value due to university 
ownership, or to other heterogeneity between the two samples? Possibly, the observed 
heterogeneity between the two samples might even be causally related to the ownership value 
(this is what, e.g., the Aghion and Tirole model assumes), which further complicates drawing 
inference on the effects of university ownership.  
 
We approach this problem by two separate statistical techniques, both explained in more 
detail in Appendix 2. The first of these estimates a regression explaining in turn each of the 
commercialization and value variables. The explanatory variables include a wide range of 
possible factors influencing the commercialization or v alue, and this list includes the 
university ownership value. In this way, we hope to disentangle the various influences on 
commercialization and value, so that we can identify the university ownership effect 
separately. 
 
The second technique that we apply starts from identifying the university owned patents as a 
sample of so-called ‘treated’ patents (the ‘treatment’ is university ownership). It then 
proceeds by constructing a control sample of ‘non-treated’ (university invented) patents. The 
point is that the control group should be as similar as possible to the treated sample in all 
ways, except, of course, the treatment (university ownership). Given the adequacy of such a 
control group, we can apply a t-test for differences in the means of the commercialization and 
value variables to test our research hypotheses.  
 
The way in which we construct our control group is a two-stage process (Rosenbaum and 
Rubin, 1983). This starts by estimating a (logit) regression for the treatment (ownership) 
variable. This regression is aimed at explaining which patents are university owned, and 
hence the predicted values from this provide an estimated probability that a particular patent 
will be university owned. We then, in the second stage, construct the control sample by 
drawing for each treated patent a control that has a probability score that is as close as 
possible to the treated patent.  
 
5.1. Control function regressions 
The results from estimating the control function using are summarised in Table 7. In all the 
regressions we also add as control a time variable capturing the time elapsed between the 
patent application and the survey. In this way we can control for the fact that patents have 
been exposed to diffusion processes for different times. Given the different scaling of the 
variables, we apply a range of regression models. In the first four columns, which are all 
dealing with binary dummy variables, we use a probit model. In the regression for value, we 
apply a simple OLS model, and in the model for citations, we use a negative binomial model. 
Obviously, the nature of the estimated coefficients varies between those models. 
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Table 7. Regression results 
  Patent used  Commercial used  Licensed  Start up  Value (ln)   Forward citations 
University owned  0.146  0.063  0.353  0.034  -0.21  -0.389 
  (1.99**)  (0.78)  (5.44***)  (1.28)  (0.95)  (0.91) 
ES  -0.299  -0.156  -0.126  -0.042  0.161  1.506 
  (2.13**)  (1.10)  (1.85*)  (1.21)  (0.37)  (2.16**) 
DE  -0.154  -0.103  -0.100  -0.096  -1.274  2.607 
  (2.05**)  (1.30)  (2.10**)  (3.10***)  (5.62***)  (6.41***) 
NL  -0.211  -0.079  -0.141  -0.013  -0.819  0.583 
  (2.48**)  (0.92)  (3.04***)  (0.54)  (3.16***)  (1.02) 
FR  0.416  0.564  -0.204    -0.99  1.252 
  (4.48***)  (5.80***)  (4.60***)    (3.79***)  (2.66***) 
IT  -0.259  -0.076  -0.14  -0.029  -0.432  1.979 
  (2.24**)  (0.79)  (2.51**)  (1.11)  (1.52)  (4.42***) 
ISI_ElEng  -0.256  -0.204  0.078  0.059  0.175  0.443 
  (2.23**)  (1.83*)  (0.82)  (1.16)  (0.53)  (0.98) 
ISI_Instr  -0.117  -0.165  0.121  0.023  0.098  0.21 
  (1.11)  (1.57)  (1.35)  (0.55)  (0.32)  (0.54) 
ISI_ChePha  -0.397  -0.381  0.085  -0.012  0.208  0.226 
  (4.05***)  (3.89***)  (1.05)  (0.32)  (0.72)  (0.57) 
ISI_PrEng  -0.176  -0.214  0.157  -0.018  -0.252  0.074 
  (1.62)  (2.01**)  (1.68*)  (0.46)  (0.81)  (0.18) 
Age    -0.012         
    (2.08**)         
Graduation  0.019  0.015        -0.018 
  (3.04***)  (2.33**)        (1.73*) 
Experience  0.018  0.019         
  (2.41**)  (2.21**)         
Tenure  0.016  0.02  0.006       
  (2.70***)  (2.96***)  (3.28***)       
Postdoc degree  -0.192           
  (2.19**)           
EPO patent appl.  0.112  0.167         
  (2.26**)  (3.15***)         
R&D total costs          0.191   
          (4.08***)   
Man Months    -0.032       
      (2.81***)       
Family  0.124  0.129    0.043     
  (2.27**)  (2.23**)    (2.13**)     
N
o words claim (ln)            0.367 
            (2.11**) 
N
o IPC 4 digit (ln)  0.146  0.108  0.076  0.050     
  (2.39**)  (1.69*)  (1.75*)  (2.33**)     
N
o inventors      -0.048     
        (2.47**)     
Multiple applicants  -0.193    -0.051     
    (1.89*)    (1.83*)     
Cooperation (0/1)  -0.125  -0.117  -0.122       
  (2.14**)  (1.87*)  (2.78***)       
FormCol (0/1)        -0.064     
        (2.65***)     
Time      0.029    -0.123  0.23 
      (1.93*)    (1.95*)  (2.38**) 
Constant          5.411  29.701 
          (7.75***)  (1.43) 
Observations  433  433  433  433  433  433 
(Pseudo) R
2          0.14  0.14 
Robust t-test in parenthesis. (***) denotes 1% significance level, (**) denotes 5% significance level and (*) denotes 10% significance level.  
The first 4 columns show the marginal effects of probit model evaluate at sample means. The fifth column shows OLS results and the sixth 
column shows the negative binomial results. 
 
 
In all cases, we started by estimating a ‘full model’ that includes all variables on inventor 
background, invention background, and technology and country effects, as the explanatory 
variables. We reduced this model to a more parsimonious model by excluding, one-by-one all   19 
variables that were not significant at the 10% level or better. Country dummies, technology 
dummies and the commercialization and value variables were never removed from the 
regression, independent of their significance level. 
 
With regard to the  treatment  variable (university ownership), we observe that this is 
significant for  Patent Used (overall rate of commercialization) and licensing. It is not 
significant for the other variables, including both measures of value.
14 Thus, our finding here 
indicates that, overall, university-owned patents tend to be 15% more often used than non-
university owned patents. Of the individual categories that make up overall 
commercialization, only the effect of licensing is significant (35% more often). For value and 
citations, the treatment effect is in fact negative, but not significantly so (last two columns). 
 
The results for the remaining control variables are also interesting to briefly inspect. First, the 
country effects tend to be highly significant across all columns and they seem to be more 
important than the technology effects. This is consistent with the results of a previous study 
showing an higher relevance of country effects compare to technology effects on the mobility 
of academic inventors (Crespi, Geuna and Nesta; 2005). The UK, where technology transfer 
offices and their associations (UNICO/AURIL) have existed longer, is the reference country 
(its dummy has been excluded from the estimations), and the generally negative signs for the 
other countries in the first four columns indicate that commercialization is relatively high in 
the UK.  
 
Country-level institutional factors play a more important role than technological specificities. 
Of the technology effects, only few are significant, and these seem to point out that in 
electrical engineering and chemicals and pharmaceuticals, commercialization is less frequent. 
 
Regarding inventors’ background,  we find that experience (in general terms) contributes 
positively to the rate of commercialization. The variables Graduation, Experience, Tenure, 
and the number of EPO patent applications all show up with positive and significant 
coefficients in at least two equations. Age and having a postdoc degree, on the other hand, 
have a significant negative impact in one equation. None of the variables in the inventors 
characteristics block, however, has a very robust influence on the two value indicators. 
 
This is similar in the project characteristics block. Here, we find that economic value, in our 
approach is only explained by the R&D budget (and country effects).
15 The number of words 
in the claims of the patent explains the number of forward citations. The other variables have 
an influence on the commercialization indicators. Interestingly, larger projects (in terms of 
man months) show a lower rate of licensing. Whether or not a patent is part of a larger set of 
interrelated patents (family) affects commercialization positively, and so does the number of 
IPC classes that apply to the patent. The number of inventors, the number of applicants, and 
the two collaboration variables affect commercialization negatively. 
 
5.2. Treatment effects and matching 
The first stage of the treatment effect method is the estimation of the probit equation that 
predicts university ownership. We use the familiar set of regressors in this equation. The 
                                                                 
14 The signs and significance levels of the university ownership variable is always identical between the full 
model and the parsimonious model, and hence our conclusions are not affected by including or excluding 
explanatory variables. 
15 Gambardella, Harhoff and Verspagen (21005) provide a more elaborate approach to explaining patent value 
than we can offer here, and provide more enlightening insights for the total PatVal sample.   20 
inventor-related variables are assumed to be a good proxy of the variables that Jensen, 
Thursby and Thursby (2006) rank under “researcher quality”, but note that our inventors are 
not necessarily always the university inventors. Still, we can take the observed inventor 
characteristics as representative of the set of all inventors of the patent. We would expect that 
an increase in the quality of the inventor raises the probability that the patent is assigned to 
the university. We do not have the same variables on public funding as Jensen, Thursby and 
Thursby (2006) apply, but the variables in our project characteristics block do give us an 
indication of the complexity of the project, and this captures the same tendency that Jensen, 
Thursby and Thursby capture through their funding variable. We would expect that in 
general, for “more difficult” projects, the likelihood of university ownership increases. This is 
also in line with Aghion and Tirole, since in this case the marginal university contribution 
should assumed to be higher. 
 
We also apply the same process of eliminating insignificant variables from the equation. The 
only change we make in this respect is that we only accept final specifications that satisfy the 
balancing restriction (this is a test of whether for a given propensity score, treated and control 
observations are on average observationally identical, see the  Appendix 2 for technical 
details).
16 The results of these p-score regressions are documented in Table 8.
 17 
 
We apply three different samples, corresponding to the three columns in the table. The first 
columns gives estimations for the complete sample (433 cases). Here, we find that inventors 
with recent diplomas (negative sign on Graduation), less time in the current job (negative 
sign on Tenure), with less experience in previous patenting (negative sign on number of EPO 
patents), or of a higher age (positive sign on Age) tend to have a higher probability of 
assigning the patent to the university. This is somewhat contrary to the findings in Jensen, 
Thursby and Thursby (2006), who argue that higher quality inventors are more likely to 
assign to universities. To the extent that experience is an indicator of quality, our results at 
least partially contradict this expectation, suggesting that additional theoretical work on this 
issue for Europe might provide valuable insights. 
 
                                                                 
16 If the balancing property is not satisfied, we include the last insignificant variable that we excluded, until the 
restriction is satisfied. 
17 We verify the balancing property using the procedure by Becker and Ichino (2002): after estimating the logit 
model to predict the propensity score, we split the sample into (k=5) equally spaced intervals of the propensity 
score, then within each interval, we test that the average propensity score of the treated and control units does 
not differ, it the test fails in one interval, we split the interval in half and test again. We continue until, in all 
intervals, the average propensity score of the treated and the control units does not differ. Within each interval, 
we test that the means of each characteristics do not differ between treated and control units. If the means of one 
or more characteristics differ, a less parsimonious specification of the logit is needed, as described in the main 
text. The P-value for the sequence of tests was set to 0.005.   21 
Table 8. P-score regression results (logit estimation) 
  Sample 1  Sample 2  Sample 3 
ES  0.816  0.313  1.071 
  (1.12)  (0.43)  (1.29) 
DE  -3.647  -4.300  -3.414 
  (4.81***)  (5.33***)  (3.84***) 
NL  -1.187  -1.757  -1.602 
  (2.40**)  (3.30***)  (2.91***) 
FR  -2.294  -3.045  -2.137 
  (3.91***)  (4.74***)  (3.17***) 
IT  -2.279  -1.9  -2.152 
  (2.70***)  (1.98**)  (2.24**) 
ISI_ElEng  1.416  1.628  2.203 
  (1.83*)  (1.96**)  (2.45**) 
ISI_Instr  1.226  1.551  1.939 
  (1.72*)  (2.05**)  (2.37**) 
ISI_ChePha  0.969  1.709  2.022 
  (1.37)  (2.16**)  (2.32**) 
ISI_PrEng  1.538  1.983  2.403 
  (2.00**)  (2.40**)  (2.66***) 
Age  0.085  0.108  0.108 
  (2.47**)  (3.34***)  (3.00***) 
Graduation  -0.063     
  (1.38)     
Experience  -0.166  -0.129  -0.146 
  (3.12***)  (3.25***)  (3.34***) 
Tenure  -0.171  -0.137  -0.137 
  (3.72***)  (4.04***)  (3.62***) 
Male     -1.278   
     (1.69*)   
Postdoc degree     1.205   
     (1.68*)   
EPO patent appl.  -1.592  -1.527  -1.782 
  (3.92***)  (3.63***)  (4.06***) 
Man Months  0.183  0.179  0.298 
  (1.91*)  (1.81*)  (2.66***) 
Family  0.519    0.714 
  (1.40)    (1.64) 
N
o words claim (ln)     0.563  0.53 
     (2.03**)  (1.74*) 
N
o inventors       -0.547 
       (1.41) 
Multiple applicants  1.967  2.121  2.7 
  (3.62***)  (3.69***)  (4.11***) 
Cooperation  -2.048  -2.155  -2.089 
  (4.61***)  (4.63***)  (4.05***) 
FormalCol  -0.975  -1.038  -1.701 
  (2.78***)  (2.83***)  (4.20***) 
Constant  123.274  -5.738  -6.029 
  (1.34)  (2.87***)  (2.85***) 
Observations  433  421  366 
Robust t-test in parenthesis. (***) denotes 1% significance level, (**) denotes 5% significance level and (*) denotes 10% significance level.  
Sample 1 is the complete sample, Sample 2 excludes from this 12 patents assigned to the Department of Defence in the UK, Sample 3 
compares all university-owned patents only with patents owned by firms (in the latter case, patents held by BTG in the UK are treated as 
firm patents). 
 
In the project characteristics block, the presence of multiple applicants and the project size 
(man  months) raises the probability of university ownership, which is consistent with our 
above theoretical expectations. The presence of non-university inventors (Cooperation) or the 
existence of a formal collaboration (FormalCol) decreases it. The country dummies are 
negative with the exception of Spain (the UK is the reference country), while the technology   22 
dummies for electrical engineering, instruments and precision engineering are positive and 
weakly significant (mechanical engineering is the reference technology). 
 
In the second column of Table 8, we exclude 12 patents assigned to the UK Department of 
Defence. None of these patents score a 1 on any of the commercialization variables, and they 
might therefore bias the results in favour of finding a positive effect of university ownership. 
In the third column, we exclude all patents that are not owned by a firm or a university, so 
that this sample compares university-owned patents only to firms owned patents. Thus, this 
sample excludes patents that have been assigned to individuals under the professors’ privilege 
(in Germany). In the latter case, we treat patents owned by BTG in the UK as firm owned 
patents. 
 
In these p-score regressions, we find small deviations from the first column, but on the whole 
the results are similar. Interestingly, the number of words in the main claims of the patent 
becomes positively related to university ownership, as do the dummy for male inventors and 
the dummy for a postdoc degree (only in the second column). 
 
Table 9a. Nearest Neighbour Matching results, complete sample 
        Analytical se  Bootstrapped se 
  treated.  control  ATT  Std. Err.  t  Std. Err.  t 
Patent Used  79  39  0.165  0.123  1.34  0.140  1.18 
Commercial App  79  39  -0.025  0.126  -0.20  0.138  -0.18 
Licensed  79  39  0.418  0.107  3.89***  0.096  4.36*** 
Start-up  79  39  0.114  0.095  1.20  0.086  1.32 
Ln(Value)  79  39  -0.230  0.450  -0.51  0.430  -0.53 
Fwd_cit  79  39  0.025  0.108  0.23  0.148  0.17 
 
Table 9b. Nearest Neighbour Matching results, excluding defence patents 
        Analytical se  Bootstrapped se 
  treated.  control  ATT  Std. Err.  t  Std. Err.  t 
Patent Used  79  37  0.063  0.143  0.44  0.157  0.40 
Commercial App  79  37  -0.139  0.146  -0.95  0.173  -0.80 
Licensed  79  37  0.456  0.103  4.42***  0.107  4.26*** 
Start-up  79  37  0.076  0.113  0.67  0.170  0.45 
Ln(Value)  79  37  0.086  0.501  0.17  0.644  0.13 
Fwd_cit  79  37  -0.127  0.159  -0.79  0.248  -0.51 
 
Table 9c. Nearest Neighbour Matching results, comparison only with firm-owned 
        Analytical se  Bootstrapped se 
  treated.  control  ATT  Std. Err.  t  Std. Err.  t 
Patent Used  79  32  0.203  0.149  1.36  0.177  1.14 
Commercial App  79  32  -0.013  0.150  -0.08  0.181  -0.07 
Licensed  79  32  0.405  0.129  3.14***  0.153  2.65*** 
Start-up  79  32  0.089  0.119  0.74  0.167  0.53 
Ln(Value)  79  32  0.464  0.421  1.10  0.674  0.69 
Fwd_cit  79  32  0.025  0.224  0.11  0.125  0.20 
 
 
The average treatments effects as measured by setting up the control samples are documented 
in Tables 9a  – 10c. Tables 9a-c documents results from a nearest neighbour matching 
method, while those in Table 10a-10c use kernel matching. The results in both tables have   23 
been generated by using the common support constraint.
18 Kernel matching (Tables 10a-10c) 
has the advantage that more observations are used, but standard errors for the observed 
treatment effect must be derived from bootstrapping. In terms if the qualitative conclusions, 
the results usually match between the two methods (we will discuss the one exception 
below). 
 
In Tables 9a-10c, we observe only a significant, and positive, treatment effect for the 
licensing variable. The other variables are not significant, although the variable for overall 
commercialization (Patent Used) is positive. Interestingly, we observe the largest (but still 
insignificant) effect on overall commercialization when we compare university owned patents 
to firm owned patents only. The sign of the treatment effect for value and patent citations 
differs between the samples, but is never significant. These results are confirmed with kernel 
matching (Tables 10a-10c), with the exception of the overall commercialization variable in 
the complete sample (Table 10a). This is positive and weakly significant in Table 10a, while 
it was insignificant in Table 9a.  
 
Thus, overall, we do not find strong evidence of an effect of university ownership on either 
commercialization or economic value of patents. Universities do tend to license more of their 
patents, but this does not lead very clearly to an increase in the overall rate of 
commercialization. 
 
Table 10a. Kernel Matching results, complete sample 
        Bootstrapped se 
  treated.  control  ATT  Std. Err.  t 
Patent Used  79  239  0.186  0.107  1.74* 
Commercial App  79  239  0.003  0.108  0.03 
Licensed  79  239  0.439  0.076  5.78*** 
Start-up  79  239  0.101  0.080  1.26 
Ln(Value)  79  239  -0.092  0.353  -0.26 
Fwd_cit  79  239  -0.077  0.133  -0.58 





Table 10b. Kernel Matching results, excluding defence patents 
        Bootstrapped se 
  treated.  control  ATT  Std. Err.  t 
Patent Used  79  240  0.052  0.116  0.45 
Commercial App  79  240  -0.132  0.133  -0.99 
Licensed  79  240  0.418  0.087  4.82*** 
Start-up  79  240  0.019  0.154  0.12 
Ln(Value)  79  240  0.109  0.504  0.22 
Fwd_cit  79  240  -0.187  0.151  -1.24 







                                                                 
18 That means the testing of the balancing property and the estimation is performed only on observations whose 
propensity score belongs to the intersection of the supports of the propensity score of treated and controls. This 
constraint tends to increase the quality of the matching.   24 
Table 10c. Kernel Matching results, comparison only with firm-owned 
        Bootstrapped se 
  treated.  control  ATT  Std. Err.  t 
Patent Used  79  160  0.190  0.156  1.22 
Commercial App  79  160  -0.009  0.161  -0.05 
Licensed  79  160  0.389  0.124  3.14*** 
Start-up  79  160  0.058  0.123  0.47 
Ln(Value)  79  160  0.126  0.475  0.27 
Fwd_cit  79  160  -0.008  0.144  -0.05 





The lack of patenting by universities in Europe has been suggested as a problem behind the 
so-called European paradox (that Europe is strong in basic science but lags behind in 
technological applications in world markets). As a result, some have argued that Europe 
needs legislation that makes university patenting more attractive (like the Bayh-Dole Act in 
the US). We have provided an in-depth analysis of this issue and conclude that there is no 
need for such legislation. 
 
First, we find that much of the university research that leads to patents in Europe does not 
show up in the statistics, because private firms rather than the universities themselves apply 
for the patent. About 80% of the EPO patents with at least one academic inventor are not 
owned by the university. Hence, there is no statistical record of the university involvement in 
the patent office records. Thus, the lack of university patents in Europe is really a lack of 
university-owned patents, not necessarily a lack of university-invented patents. Once the data 
are corrected to take into account of the different ownership structure in Europe and the US, 
very simple back-of-the-envelop calculations suggest that the European academic system 
seems to perform much better than what was believed until now. In relative term, European 
universities patenting output lags behind only marginally to the one of US universities.   
 
Second, we have undertaken a statistical analysis of the effects of university ownership on the 
rate of commercial application (diffusion) of a patent, and on the commercial value of a 
patent. The analysis controls for the different (ex ante observed) characteristics of university-
owned and non-university owned patents, and hence is in accordance with the theory that 
suggests that university ownership is the endogenous outcome of a bargaining game. Both 
before and after controlling for such differences between patents, we find no statistically 
significant effects of university ownership of patents. The only significant (positive) effect 
that we find is that university-owned patents are more often licensed out, but this does not 
lead to an overall increase in the rate of commercial use.  
 
Hence we conclude that no additional legislation is needed to make university patenting more 
attractive in Europe. Whether or not universities own commercially interesting patents 
resulting from their research, is taken care of by the market, and we find no indication of 
market failure.   25 
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Appendix 1: Questions from the PatVal Questionnaire 
 
F.2 Has the applicant/owner ever used this patent for commercial or industrial purposes? 
 
F.3 Has this patent been licensed by (one of) the patent-holder(s) to an independent party? 
 
F.4 Has this patent been exploited commercially by yourself or any of your co-inventors by 
starting a new company? 
 
F.7 This is a hypothetical question: “Suppose that on the day in which this patent was 
granted, the applicant had all the information about the value of the patent that is available 
today. If a potential competitor of the applicant was interested in buying the patent, what 
would be the minimum price the applicant would demand?” 
   28 
Appendix 2. Statistical methodology  
 
A1 The control function approach
19  
The control function approach rests on the idea that it is possible to identify the average 
impact of a given ‘treatment’ (in this case, university ownership) using regression-based 
techniques conditioning on a large set of explanatory variables that might be correlated with 
both the treatment and the outcomes. Let us assume that we want to estimate the impact of 
university ownership on a variable Y. This variable can take two values depending on if the 
sample patent is owned by university or not. More formally: 
i1 1 i1 ? µ Y + = (1) 
i0 0 i0 ? µ Y + = (2) 
 
where m captures the impact of a set of control variables, and n captures the gain (or loss) as a 
result of the treatment. Of course, a given patent cannot be in the two states at the same time, 
and for this reason we need to approach the non-owned state by using the control group of 
patents that are not owned by universities. By defining a dummy for the treatment, we can 
combine (1) and (2) in a unique expression: 
 
( ) ( ) 0 1 , 0 , i i owned i 0 1 owned i 0 i v v D ? D µ Y - + + - + = m m   (3) 
 
Here is where we introduce the idea of control function. Let us assume that we can 
approximate the patent-specific shocks, potentially correlated with the outcomes and the 
treatment, by large set of observed variables plus an unobserved (uncorrelated) term as 
follows: 
 
i1 1 i i1 ? ß X ? + = ,  (4)  
0 0 i i i0 X ? h b + = .  (5) 
 
Model (3) can then be re-written as: 
 
( ) ( ) 0 1 , 0 0 1 , , i i owned i i i i owned i 0 i owned i 0 i D X X D X D µ Y h h h b b b t - + + - + + + = ,  (6) 
 
where the treatment impact is given by t=(m1 – m0). Under the assumption that b1 = b0 
20, this 
model can be further summarised: 
                                                                 
19 See Wooldbridge (2002). 
20 This assumption is not strictly necessary, however given that our dependent variables are mainly discrete, this 
makes the impact estimation easier. If we relax this assumption we also need to include interactions in the 
control function between the dummy variable for ownership and the remaining explanatory variables, dealing 
with interactions in probit or logit settings is not as straightforward one can think (see Norton and Ai, 2004 for 
further details). The intuition from linear models does not extend to non-linear models. To illustrate consider the 
following probit model: 
( ) ( ) 2 1 12 2 1 1 2 1, | x x x x x x y E s b b b + + F =  










Most researchers interpret this as the interaction effect. However, the full interaction effect is the cross-partial 
derivative of the expected value of y:   29 
i i owned i 0 i X D µ Y J b t + + + = , ,  (7)
21 
 
where the impact of being a university owned patent is now identified under the assumption 
that this state is orthogonal with respect to the remaining unobserved part of the treatment 
shock. In the empirical application of below we control for the large set of explanatory 
variables shown in Tables 4 and 5. 
 
A2 The matching approach 
The descriptive statistics from Table 5 suggest that the assignment of the university patents to 
treatment or control groups is not at random. In this context, the impact estimation may be 
biased by the existence of confounding factors. Following Becker and Ichino (2002), 
matching is a way to “correct” the estimation of treatment effects controlling for the existence 
of these confounding factors based on the idea that the bias can be reduced when the 
comparison of outcomes is performed using treated and control patents who are as similar as 
possible given a, hopefully, large set of control variables. Since matching subjects on an n-
dimensional vector of characteristics is typically unfeasible for large n, this method proposes 
to summarise pre-treatment characteristics of each subject into a single-index variable (the 
propensity score) that makes the matching feasible.  
 
Following Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), the propensity score is defined as the conditional 
probability of receiving a treatment given pre-treatment characteristics: 
 
( ) ( ) i owned i, i owned i, i X D E X D Pr ) p(X | | 1 = = ” ,  (8) 
 
where Di,owned=(0, 1) is the indicator of exposure to treatment and Xi is the multidimensional 
vector of pre-treatment characteristics. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) show that if the 
exposure to treatment is random within cells defined by  X, it is also random within cells 
defined by the values of the one-dimensional variable p(Xi). As a result, the average treatment 
effect on the treated (ATT) can be estimated as follows: 
 
{ }
( ) { } [ ]
( ) { } ( ) { } [ ] 1 | , 0 | , 1 |
, 1 |
1 |
, , 0 , 1
, 0 1
, 0
= = - = =
= - =
= - ”
owned i i owned i i i owned i i
i owned i i i
owned i i i1
D X p D Y E X p D Y E E
X p D Y Y E E
D Y Y E t
(9) 
 
where the second expectation is over the distribution of (p(Xi) Di,owned = 1). Two assumptions 
are need in order the matching estimator (9) to be valid: 
 
Assumption 1: The balancing of the pre-treatment variables given the propensity score: 
) p(X | X   D i i owned i, ^    (10) 
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Which is clearly different to what we had before. Another implication of this is that the true interaction effect 
does not vanish even when b12 is zero. And even when it is not different from zero, it signs does not necessarily 
correspond with the sign of the true interaction effect (see Norton, Wang and Ai, 2004 for further details). In 
other words, the influence of interactions is in some extent already built within the model.  
21 According to this specification the impact estimator will be the “average treatment effect” (ate) which under 
our current assumptions is also equivalent to the “average treatment effect on the treated” (att).   30 
which implies that observations with the same propensity score must have t he same 
distribution of observable (and unobservable) characteristics independently of treatment 
status. In other words, for a given propensity score treated and control observations should be 
on average observationally identical.  This assumption can be tested 
 
Assumption 2: Conditional independence given the propensity score: 
 
) p(X | D   Y Y i owned i, i0 i1, ^   (11) 
 
To ensure that the matching estimators identify and consistently estimate the treatment effect 
of interest, we assume that the assignment to treatment  is independent of the outcomes, 
conditional on the covariates. In other words, we need to assume that the choice of patent 
ownership be “purely random” for similar patents (Imbens, 2005 and Abadie, Drukker, Leber 
Herr and Imbens, 2004, for further details). Different from the previous assumption, this 
assumption cannot be tested.
22 
 
We have made used of two different matching estimators: the Nearest-Neighbour matching 
and the Kernel matching. Under Nearest-Neighbour matching we take each university owned 
patent and search for the non-university owned patent with the closest propensity score. The 
method is applied with replacement, in the sense that a control patent can be a best match for 
more than one treated patent. Once each treated unit is matched with a control unit, the 
difference between the outcome of the treated units and the outcome of the matched control 
unit is computed. The average treatment on the treated impact is then obtained by averaging 
these differences. More formally, let C(i) denote the s et of control units matched to the 
treated unit with an estimated value of the propensity score. Nearest-neighbour matching sets: 
 
( ) j i
j p p min i C - =  (12) 
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Where  Ni is the number of nearest controls for university owned patent i. For nearest 
neighbour matching this typically one unless there are multiple nearest neighbours, which 

















t   (14) 
 
Although the Nearest Neighbour matching method sounds as the most natural way to proceed 
because all treated patents will find a match, it is obvious that some of these matches will be 
fairly poor because for some treated units the nearest neighbour may be very far in terms of 
the propensity score, but despite this it will make the same contribution to the treatment effect 
as a very good match. The Kernel matching method offers a solution to this problem. Here all 
                                                                 
22 This assumption is also known as unconfoundedness (Imbens, 2005)  or ignorability assumption (Wooldridge, 
2002).   31 
treated are matched with a weighted average of all controls with weights that are inversely 
proportional to the distance between the propensity scores of the treated and the controls. 




























































where G(.) is a kernel function and hn a bandwidth parameter. Both matching methods require 
the estimation of the propensity score. Any standard probability model can be used for this. 
In our case we use a logit model, that is: 
 
( ) ( ) { } i i owned i, X R F X D Pr = = | 1   (16) 
where F(.) is the logistic cumulative distribution and  R(.) is a function of covariates with 
linear and, if necessary, higher order terms. 
 
How can the results of the two approaches be compared? In general we do not expect that the 
two  methods give exactly the same results at least for two reasons. First, different to the 
control function approach, matching does not require the specification of any response 
function similar to (7), for this reason matching is usually considered as a non-parametric 
estimator. In our case, this issue is even more relevant because by the same nature of the 
dependent variable, discrete or count data methods have to be used, which requires further 
assumptions in terms of the distribution of the shocks. Second, while the matching method 
gives an estimation of the “treatment on the treated” effect (that is what the diffusion process 
of university owned patents would have been in case the were not owned by any university), 
the control function method gives a estimate of the “average treatment effect”, which is the 
expected effect of treatment on a randomly drawn patent from the population of university 
based patents. This is true under the assumption that the marginal effects of the probit models 
are evaluated at the total sample means. An estimate of the treated on the treated effect would 
require the marginal effects of the probit model be evaluated at the sub sample mean of 
university owned patents
23.   
 
                                                                 
23 As we will see in the next section the only two exceptions for this are the linear model for the impact 
measured on patent values and the negative binomial model for forward citations. In both cases, under the 
assumption that b1 = b0, the interaction terms disappear and the “average treatment effect” is similar to the 
“average treatment on the treated”. 